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SUMMARY 
At the epicenter of the international financial crisis is a debt crisis where low-quality assets 
and the slowdown in economic activity have made creditors worldwide wary of the ability and 
willingness of debtors to comply with their obligations. In this context of indebtedness, now 
perceived as excessive, where expenses on interest are growing, some defend debt 
restructuring to alleviate this burden. This brief note aims to contribute towards the current 
debate with an analysis of the benefits and costs related to the possible but uncertain 
unilateral decision by Portugal to alleviate its expenses on interest. Considering i) the most 
recent international evidence that suggests that in the majority of the cases a debt 
restructuring is accompanied by a banking crisis and/or by a currency crisis, ii) that Portugal 
does not meet any of the cost-minimizing criteria, and iii) that an exit from the euro would 
probably be inevitable as a result of such a decision, we conclude that Portugal ought not 
restructure its debt.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for an instant that the Executive is pondering a restructuring of the Portuguese debt. 
The question that immediately follows is “What implications would such a decision have?”. It 
would have a few benefits and a few costs that are worth analyzing. Nonetheless, the 
historically backed-up fact that a sovereign State only goes ahead with a restructuring of its 
debt when it has no other available options suggests that, probably, total costs outweigh total 
benefits. 
Those who see a restructuring of debt as an alternative  to austerity are clearly mistaken. In 
this article we present a few reasons why, with a restructuring of debt, the adjustment of the 
Portuguese economy would probably be more brutal than what is happening at present. 
Likewise, a restructuring does not guarantee a sustainable trajectory for the dynamics of debt 
(International Monetary Fund, 2006).  
Before detailing the costs and benefits inherent to a restructuring, it is worth trying to 
understand what restructuring of debt is. In simple terms, it consists in altering the form of 
existing debt with the objective of alleviating interest expenses. Such an alteration could be 
attained i) by reducing the nominal or face value of the debt (this would be classified as a 
“haircut” if the reduction were less than 100% and would be classified as a “default” in case 
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of a complete reduction), or ii) by lowering the implicit interest rates, or iii) by lengthening 
the maturity of the loans.   
The remainder of this note is as follows: Section 2 presents the benefits inherent to a 
restructuring of debt in Portugal, while Section 3 is dedicated to listing the respective costs 
and detailing the dynamic effects that would follow, as a series of negative shocks would 
propagate through the economy. Section 4 concludes with an indication of a set of criteria that 
allow an economy in those circumstances to reduce the costs related to the decision of 
restructuring its debt. For the record, Portugal does not fulfill any of the said criteria.  
 
2. BENEFITS RELATED TO RESTRUCTURING 
If, even with a restructuring of debt, one cannot escape austerity nor can one guarantee the 
sustainability of one’s debt, what then is the benefit? To be able to redirect a part or all of the 
previous expense on interest to jumpstarting economic activity in Portugal. If private 
consumption were the main beneficiary then that jumpstart would be temporary at best. To be 
more long-lasting, one would have to focus on the factors behind economic growth, probably 
using the amount saved by not paying (that much on) interest to facilitate the most important 
structural reforms.  
 
3. COSTS RELATED TO RESTRUCTURING 
According to the IMF (see International Monetary Fund, 2003) every episode of debt 
restructuring is different. It is always a leap into the unknown because there is no pattern or 
script as to how a debt crisis unfolds. Having said that, we have to examine the empirical 
evidence and see what it suggests. 
There are naturally many studies on the impact of a debt crisis on GDP (for a discussion of 
the existing literature see, for example, International Monetary Fund, 2002 or, the more 
encyclopedic Roubini and Setser, 2004). In this note, however we choose to reference a more 
recent article by the Bank of England (De Paoli, Hoggarth e Sapporta, 2009) that bypasses the 
well-known econometric problem of endogeneity, due to a joint causality between the 
dependent variable and some of the explanatory variables. This research adopts a significantly 
more sophisticated methodology compared to the previous effort by the same authors (De 
Paoli, Hoggarth e Sapporta, 2006). Analyzing 32 episodes in emerging economies that 
occurred between 1970 and 2000, they conclude that most frequently (in 53% of the cases 
observed) debt crises rarely occurred in isolation; they are typically accompanied by banking 
crises and/or by currency crises, something that raises the median duration of the crisis from 4 
to 14 years and that accentuates the annual fall in GDP from 2.5% to 11.1%. For Portugal, 
restructuring its debt would very likely entail having to abandon the euro, something that 
would make the occurrence of a triple crisis even more probable. It is in this analytical setting 
that this note presents and details the costs related to a restructuring of debt. 
In the Portuguese case, an immediate implication of restructuring its debt would be to stop 
receiving the outstanding tranches of the €78 billion loaned to us (International Monetary 
Fund, 2011). Without short-term financing, Portugal would face the same cash-flow problems 
it encountered in mid 2011 that led to the bailout agreement.  
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Would Portugal then be excluded from the international capital markets? Possibly yes in 
the very-short term, but that would not last more than one year (a situation that would already 
be very problematic in terms of cash-flow management). The more important question, 
however, is under what conditions would Portugal have access to financing? Reflecting a 
higher country-specific risk, financing costs would be permanently higher than if the 
restructuring episode had never happened. Historical evidence (see, for example, International 
Monetary Fund, 2006) suggests that, even for those countries that, having restructured their 
debt, then went on to correct their excessive indebtedness, the market tends to permanently 
attribute a worse credit rating and a more elevated spread. If, a couple of years later, there are 
few opportunities at a global level to earn a reasonable real return, then we can expect foreign 
investors (seeking out higher yields) to return to the country that was once pariah.  
And could Portugal suffer other penalties by foreign creditors, for example in the form of 
trade sanctions? It’s possible but unlikely, given that the creditors that provide trade credit 
are typically not the same ones that suffer losses from restructured debt. In any case, one 
could expect a few short-term disturbances that would delay the delivery of medication and 
energy, for example.  
In addition to foreign creditors, some domestic economic agents would also suffer losses 
from restructured debt. That would be the case of financial intermediaries such as banks and 
pension funds and also of a few firms. The situation would be all the more serious for the 
balance sheet of these entities if the immediate liquidity needs were such that they could not 
wait for the price of the Treasuries to recover. A weakened balance sheet would thus imply 
greater difficulties for banks to grant credit to the economy and also for firms to finance an 
expansion of their activity.  
Unfortunately, the bad news for the Portuguese economy would not stop there. As will 
soon become clear in what follows, a debt restructuring episode can be the trigger of a more 
generalized financial crisis accompanied by a strong reduction in economic activity. In that 
case, the strategy aimed at redirecting the interest expense towards jumpstarting the economy 
may not reach the intended objective if economic agents lose their access to financing from 
domestic and foreign creditors.  
But, if Portugal stops paying interest on its debt, is fiscal austerity no longer necessary? A 
short-lived break would be achieved that would allow us some breathing space for a few 
months, if that much. The problem would come later on. Without the same access to capital 
markets, it would quickly become evident that nobody would finance the budget deficit. At 
that moment in time, total public spending would have to be ratcheted down to total public 
revenues, that would not only be below trend, they would also be falling sharply given a 
narrowing of the tax bases as a result of teetering economic activity. Portugal would then feel 
a fiscal squeeze on the spending side like it has never felt before, with even more significant 
cuts to civil servants’ wages, pensioners’ entitlements and all other remaining spending items.    
If a regime of financial repression were in place whereby banks would be obligated to buy 
public debt securities, then the quality of the assets held on their balance sheets would further 
deteriorate, thus implying a new contraction to the credit granted to all economic agents. If 
such a situation were to persist for some time, banks would have to be recapitalized, either 
with huge costs for the Treasury, leading to a new round of fiscal austerity, or otherwise with 
help from the central bank, if Portugal were to already have an independent monetary policy. 
This alternative would result in unexpected inflation that would probably lead to a generalized 
crisis of confidence, of which a sustained currency depreciation would be a nasty symptom. 
Portugal would thus enter into an even more dangerous phase for its economy. The breach of 
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confidence in the Portuguese State by economic agents (first foreign and then domestic ones) 
would be the starting point of a deep, general and long-lasting financial crisis. 
If, as a result of debt restructuring, domestic economic agents were to question the capacity 
and commitment of the Portuguese State in honoring its domestic obligations, then a bank run 
could occur, given the frailty of the banking sector at that time. In such a case, not even an 
insurance mechanism that guarantees deposits would be of much help.  
After a decapitalization of the banks, capital would further flee from the debtor country, 
not only by foreigners but also by domestic economic agents. With the objective of wealth 
preservation in real terms, everyone would enact a strategy of substituting domestic currency 
denominated assets for those denominated in foreign currency. With a domestic currency 
other than the euro, Portugal would quickly lose the foreign exchange reserves it currently 
has, thus precipitating a brutal domestic currency depreciation.   
For those who think that a depreciation of the domestic currency would be advantageous in 
the sense that it would help boost exports through a (temporary) gain in cost competitiveness 
would do well to remember the vicious cycle of competitive devaluations we experienced in 
Portugal in the 80s/90s (see, for exemple, Abreu, 2001). First, a currency depreciation would 
make imports more expensive when measured in the domestic currency, thus raising the cost 
of living and feeding a spiral of ever-increasing expected inflation. Second, the gains in terms 
of cost-competitiveness (measured, for example, using the real exchange rate) were always 
temporary, because they disappeared with an inflation in Portugal that was always higher than 
that of our competitors. Third, a currency depreciation increased the domestic value of the 
debts denominated in foreign currency, thus further degrading the balance sheets of the banks 
and firms that had obtained loans from foreigners. In a context of inflation that is out of 
control, sooner or later a contractionary monetary policy would follow with the objective of 
slowing the loss in value of the domestic currency, but that would inevitably induce a 
liquidity squeeze and a new restriction on credit to the economy. In this context, in the short 
term, it would be close to impossible to find reasons to justify a quick economic recovery.    
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The reader that has made it this far without having skipped Section 3 must surely be thinking: 
on one hand, it’s possible that if Portugal unilaterally restructures its debt to lower its interest 
expense then a catastrophic outcome will occur; on the other hand, she wonders how likely 
such a tragic scenario is and whether in the recent past there were at least a few debt 
restructuring episodes that were successful.  
Obviously not all debt restructuring episodes that ever occurred turned out to be 
disastrous. In that sense, in an attempt to convince the reader that not only would such a tragic 
outcome in Portugal be possible but also highly likely, it is worth listing a set of 
circumstances under which the costs related to a restructuring of debt would be less 
significant, thus adding some light to a very somber macroeconomic outlook. 
In Section 3 we presented the labyrinth of channels through which a restructuring of debt 
by a sovereign can propagate through the economy, leading to a series of obstacles to a 
jumpstart of economic activity. These very negative dynamic effects that are also self-
reinforcing until a regime change is prompted can obviously be toned down in certain cases. 
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The costs related to a restructuring of debt will be minimized in an economy characterized by 
the following:  
a) Firms finance themselves mostly through equity and not through debt; 
b) The banking sector is not characterized by a regime of financial repression (i.e. the 
banks are not obligated to buy Treasuries); 
c) Foreign indebtedness is relatively low; 
d) The country is not very dependent on trade, in terms of having to import raw materials 
and energy, for example; and 
e) The central bank has ample foreign exchange reserves.  
Criteria a) allows the economy to soften the fall in GDP that results from a restricted supply 
of credit by the banks. Criteria b) short-circuits the vicious cycle between the loss of value of 
Treasuries that results from higher risk premia and the financial health of the banks 
themselves that, when it takes a turn for the worse, can require a bank recapitalization with 
severe fiscal costs, thus confirming the initial suspicion by financial markets. Criteria c) 
ensures that a currency depreciation or devaluation does not increase the value of the banks’ 
and firms’ liabilities when these liabilities are measured in terms of the domestic currency. 
Criteria d) ensures that trade sanctions are mostly ineffective. And finally, criteria e) 
guarantees that the central bank has the firepower to defend itself from a currency attack. 
Unfortunately, Portugal does not fit any of these criteria, and thus we are led to conclude 
that it ought not restructure its debt. 
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